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GENEVA AND BACK AGAIN 
LEILA NADYA SADAT

 
I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a 
nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by 
the content of their character.  
—The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King 
Lincoln Memorial, Washington, DC, August 28, 1963 
For decades, social and physical scientists have asserted that “race” is a 
social construct rather than a biological reality. Conversely, skin color is 
objectively identifiable. Yet, the law has focused largely upon racial 
categories to remedy discrimination against individuals based upon their 
skin color or “racial” identification. The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution includes both race and color as separate 
grounds of protection,
1
 a distinction picked up in U.S. civil rights 
legislation
2
 and international human rights instruments including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but 
discussion of race continues to dominate the field. While some authors 
continue to argue that race is “real” either from a biological or sociological 
 
 
   Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law and Director, Whitney R. Harris World Law 
Institute, Washington University School of Law; Special Adviser on Crimes Against Humanity to the 
ICC Prosecutor. 
 1. It provides, “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  
 2. Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon color as well as race. See 42 USC §§ 2000 et 
seq. (2001) and EEOC Compliance Manual. 
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perspective,
3
 and others continue to challenge its biological and legal 
salience, this debate has proven largely unsatisfactory to policy makers 
and others interested in understanding both the social construction of race 
and skin color and its impact on the lives of individuals.  
This debate is not only taking place in the United States, but all over 
the world. As one of the authors in this Issue, William Aceves, notes, 
“there is growing skepticism within the human rights community about the 
legitimacy of using racial categories to distinguish human beings.”
4
 
Aceves points to the 2009 statement of the Durban Review Conference, 
later echoed by the Report of the High Commission for Human Rights in 
2014, stating: 
That all peoples and individuals constitute one human family, rich 
in diversity, and that all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights; and strongly rejects any doctrine of racial 
superiority along with theories which attempt to determine the 
existence of so-called distinct human races.
5
  
Moreover, as globalization continues apace and individuals migrate from 
country to country, large communities of immigrants have suffered less 
from discrimination based upon race per se but from other forms prejudice 
levied against them based upon their religion, their national origin, or, as 
the articles in this symposium suggest, their skin color. Picking up on this 
global trend and frustrated with the failure of academic and public 
discourse—particularly in the United States—to recognize this shift of 
rhetoric and the continuing harm of skin tone bias either as a proxy for 
“racial discrimination” or as a harm in its own right, in 2014, Washington 
University Law Professor Kimberly Jade Norward published an edited 
volume entitled “Color Matters: Skin Tone Bias and the Myth of a Post-
racial America.” The book received widespread attention immediately 
following its appearance, and was critically acclaimed for its emphasis on 
color and skin tone as driving bias against individuals in multiple ways. 
Colorism (in the United States) has been defined as “a process that 
privileges light-skinned people of color over dark in areas such as income, 
 
 
 3. See, e.g., Robin O. Andreasen, Race. Biological Reality or Social Construct, 67 PHIL. OF SCI. 
(PROCEEDINGS), S653 (2000). 
 4. William J. Aceves, Two Stories about Skin Color and International Human Rights Advocacy, 
14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 563, 564 (2015). 
 5. Id. (quoting Outcome Document of the Durban Review Conference, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.211/8 (Apr. 24, 2009)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/6
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education, housing, and the marriage market.”
6
 As Professor Norwood 
observes,  
[I]t is true that discrimination based on race is harder to get away 
with today. American society has clearly advanced in that regard. 
But I believe that, as race is evolving, another form of 
discrimination is on the rise. In other words, while it is true that 
more people of color—and blacks in particular—are visible in the 
media and in corporate America, why are these people more often 
light in skin tone?
7
 
In her article in this Issue, as well as her 2014 book,
8
 Professor Norwood 
uses evidence from around the globe, as well as in the United States, to 
demonstrate that in most cultures, including our own, lighter is better. As 
she observes, “millions of people of color not only hate the skin they live 
in but they long to be lighter in skin color.”
9
 This leads not only to 
negative consequences in terms of individual self-esteem but has profound 
negative long-term effects. She concludes: 
Black and brown people will become a majority in the United States 
in the next few decades. In other words, America is becoming less 
white. Yet, unless colorism is acknowledged, the rising black and 
brown majority will continue to associate power and privilege with 
white skin and that association will continue the color caste 
hierarchy currently entrenched in American society. . . . If we are 
not careful, a new form of slavery will rise and while it will not be 
based on race, it will surely look and act like race-based slavery 
censored long ago.
10
  
From April 2–3, 2015, the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute at 
Washington University School of Law set out to explore Professor 
Norwood’s hypothesis, and was proud to convene a conference on Global 
 
 
 6. Margaret Hunter, The Persistent Problem of Colorism: Skin Tone, Status and Inequality, 1 
SOC. COMPASS 237, 237 (2007). Although Hunter’s definition is largely correct, it inappropriately 
includes Professor Aceves nuance—that skin tone bias may sometimes disfavor lighter skinned 
individuals, such as Albinos. The same comment was made during the conference regarding light-
skinned Native Americans who are not treated as properly belonging to Native American 
communities. 
 7. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Introduction, 3 in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE 
MYTH OF A POST RACIAL AMERICA (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2014) 
 8. Kimberly Jade Norwood, “If You is White, You’s Alright. . . .” Stories about Colorism in 
America, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 585 (2015). 
 9. Norwood, supra note 7, at 6.  
 10. Id. at 7. 
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Perspectives on Colorism, honoring Professor Norwood’s path-breaking 
work. Believed to be the first global conference ever convened on the legal 
and sociological effects of color, the conference brought together speakers 
from all over the world—Latin America, Europe, Israel, India and the 
United States—as well as individuals hailing from different academic and 
professional disciplines. The opening keynote address was delivered by 
Dr. Carlos Moore, writer, ethnologist and social scientist, and was 
followed by five panels on “The Globalization of Skin Tone Preference,” 
“Shade-ism Among Blacks, Bi- and Multi-Racial Americans in the United 
States,” “The Effects of Color on Native Americans, Latin Americans and 
Immigrants of Color,” “Understanding Color Distinctions in Asia,” and 
“Human Rights Protections for Color under International Law.” With 
plenty of time for discussion and with many speakers using film or 
television clips to make their points, the conference demonstrated, 
incontrovertibly, the terrible toll that skin tone bias works not only in the 
United States but within sub-groups in the United States and around the 
world. What we could not have known when organizing the event a year 
earlier, is how the killing of an African-American teenager, Michael 
Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri on August 9, 2014, would bring these 
global issues to a head in a way that was up close and personal for the St. 
Louis community, and highlight the need for conferences like ours, as well 
as the need for a concrete follow up agenda.  
The Articles in this symposium represent but a sampling of the 
discussions and presentations that occurred last April, but they are fine 
ones. Interestingly, other than the contribution by Professor Norwood to 
this Issue, they focus less on the experience of African Americans, a major 
focus of Professor Norwood’s work and a subject addressed by several 
conference presenters, than on the experience of other groups in the United 
States and abroad. For example, the Articles by Vinay Harpalani, Kim 
Chanbonpin and Tanya Banks address the experience of Asian Americans 
from different perspectives. Professor Harpalani agrees with Professor 
Norwood in his Article, To be White, Black or Brown? South Asian 
Americans and the Race-Color Distinction, that “skin color is the primary 
physical feature associated with race. . . and has become a metaphor for 
race.”
11
 He adds, however, that racial status is more complex than the 
notion of color; and “can involve various characteristics and perceptions,” 
that function as a “social and political demarcator that can yield privileges 
 
 
 11. Vinay Harpalani, To Be White, Black, or Brown? South Asian Americans and the Race-Color 
Distinction, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 609, 612 (2015). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/6
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or disadvantages.”
12
 In a fascinating account of the “color” history of 
South Asians in America, Harpalani notes that they were sometimes 
legally classified as “white” (with some consternation), relying either on 
skin color or Aryan ancestry; but other times found the contrary; indeed, in 
1923, the United States Supreme Court itself found that a “high-caste 
Hindu” of full Indian blood was not “white,” holding that: 
It may be true that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu 
have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the 
average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable and 
profound differences between them today.
13
  
After some period of discrimination, they found themselves suddenly 
reclassified as “white” in the 1970 Census which prevented them from 
receiving protected minority status conferred by the civil rights legislation 
of the 1960s.
14
 This was subsequently reversed, but the ambiguity over the 
“racial status” and “color” of South Asian Americans continues to provoke 
discussion and negative behavior by candidates in American politics who 
have made the darker skin color of South Asian Americans a politically 
divisive issue in a variety of ways, including hurling epithets at them, or, 
ironically, attacking them either for claiming whiteness or being 
“colored.”  
Kim Chanbonpin’s excellent Article picks up where Harpalani leaves 
off, demonstrating how the “dichotomy of the Black/White binary that 
frames race discourse in the United States” is harmful to the identities and 
lives of South Asian Americans, trying to fit either into the “white” or 
“black” category, depending upon the advantages and disadvantages 
conferred.
15
 Like Harpalani, she uses anecdotes to underline her points; 
particularly pithy is her discussion of television personality Bill O’Reilly’s 
efforts to demonstrate the absence of “white privilege” by pointing to the 
success of Asian Americans. As she notes,  
If the lens through which race is viewed captures only Black and 
White, it facilitates one-way crossings over Black and White, but 
also renders invisible those peoples who actually lie between those 
two poles. . . . Neither Black nor White, racial intermediary groups 
 
 
 12. Id. at 615. 
 13. U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209 (1923) (emphasis added). 
 14. Harpalani, supra note 11, at 621. 
 15. Kim D. Chanbonpin, Between Black and White: The Coloring of Asian Americans, 14 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 637, 638 (2015). 
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like Asian Americans and Latinos lack both visibility (and thus 
political power) as well as the legal language to articulate valid 
discrimination claims.
16
  
She argues that the long-term viability of the “Black/White binary,” is 
doubtful, and that a new “and more complex racial hierarchy based on 
gradations of color will take its place,” pointing to Latin America as the 
example.
17
 She also refutes the notion of the “Model Minority” as 
rebutting the notion of white privilege and racism stopping individuals 
from achieving the American Dream.  
Finally, Taunya Banks also addresses the problem of colorism with 
respect to South Asians in the United States, focusing
18
specifically on 
employment discrimination cases brought by South Asians, especially 
Asian Indians. She notes that although colorism in the South Asian 
community doesn’t necessarily “negate or disenfranchise those who are 
dark,” or “automatically correlate to caste,” the increased popularity of 
skin lighteners in Asian communities is a worrisome trend.
19
 She 
examines some of the Title VII case law applicable to South Asians and 
notes the dismissal of cases on colorism grounds, or the complete absence 
of discrimination claims tied to color as opposed to race in others. 
Although color surfaces in describing the individuals involved, it is 
typically not treated as justiciable by the courts (because it is subsumed 
into race). She concludes that even if courts recognize colorism claims, 
“successful claims will be rare and success is difficult to attain, especially 
for South Asians.”
20
  
Three Articles in this Issue address the phenomena of colorism around 
the world: In Latin America, Japan and India. Tanya Hernández’s short 
Article on Latin America dovetails with Kim Chanbonpin’s, noting that it 
is an extraordinarily diverse land, with more than 150 million persons of 
African descent, but which has been surprisingly “racially innocent” in 
denying that color (and race) are salient features of the Latin American 
political and economic landscape. Brazil and other Latin American 
countries actively promoted immigration of white Europeans in the 19th 
 
 
 16. Id. at 653. 
 17. Id. at 654.  
 18. Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism Among South Asians: Title VII and Skin Tone 
Discrimination, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 665, 669 (2015). 
 19. Id. at 673. 
 20. Id. at 680. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/6
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Century to “whiten” their populations; making them “just as involved in 
regulating race as was that of the U.S. during Jim Crow segregation.”
21
  
In a fascinating exploration of race, color and immigrant status in 
Japan, Debito Arudou focuses on the notion of “visible minority” for 
unpacking questions of color and race in that country. Arudou notes that 
his research is not intended to show that the Japanese are “racist;” instead, 
it  
intends to outline the contours of the conscious and unconscious 
rules of interaction, and the tacit, “embedded” understandings 
within Japanese society that lead to differentiated, “othering, and 
subordinated treatment of peoples by physical appearance.”
22
  
Like Hernández, Arudou notes the general blindness in research and 
public discourse about the effect of race and color in Japan, beginning 
with its treatment and discourse about “mixed-blood children” and other 
visible minorities. He combines racial and skin tone biases by his use of 
the term, “visible minority,’ a term used primarily as a demographic 
category by Statistics Canada in connection with Canada’s Employment 
Equity Act. It defines visible minorities as “persons, other than Aboriginal 
peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.”
23
 This 
term is helpful in focusing upon the biases generated using either race or 
color as the “othering” characteristic; even within Canada, however, it is 
not free from controversy, as some prefer to be identified as a person of 
color, black, Chinese, or some other defining term.
24
 Nonetheless, 
Arudou’s use of the term in the Japanese context is potentially useful, 
particularly in his discussion of “mixed race” children and “invisible 
minorities,” (as he calls them) which include individuals physically able to 
“pass” as Japanese but stigmatized if their otherness was discovered.
25
 
Using critical race methodology, he concludes that in Japan, like the other 
 
 
 21. Tanya Katerí Hernández, Colorism and the Law in Latin America—Global Perspectives on 
Colorism Conference Remarks, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 683, 693 (2015). 
 22. Debito Arudou, Japan’s Under-Researched Visible Minorities: Applying Critical Race 
Theory to Racialization Dynamics in a Non-White Society, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 695, 
700 (2015).  
 23. See www.statcan.gc.ca/concepts/definitions/minorite1-eng.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) 
(cited in Arudou, supra note 22, at 701).  
 24. See., e.g., Equity and Inclusion Lens: Diversity Snapshot: Visible Minorities 3 (Ottawa: A 
City for Everyone 2010), available at http://documents.ottawa.ca/sites/documents.ottawa.ca/files/ 
documents/visible_minorities_2010_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).  
 25. Arudou, supra note 22, at 704.  
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countries surveyed here and in the conference at large, “colorism exists” 
despite the contrary claims of officials and even scholars.
26
 
Finally, Neha Mishra, explores the complex history of skin tone and 
bias in India. While noting that dark skin did not suggest inferiority in 
Ancient India, pointing to examples of dark-skinned and powerful deities 
like Krishna and Ram, that dramatically changed with the colonization of 
India by the British. The British made skin tone a racial issue, referring to 
themselves as “superior” and “intelligent” and to “inferior” and “black 
coloured” Indians who were not admitted to restaurants, educational 
institutions and other important venues.
27
 This has led to a situation where 
in modern India, beauty ideals glorify lighter skinned models—male and 
female and the extensive use of “fairness products” (skin lighteners).
28
 She 
notes that caste and regional differences may also influence social status 
and position, but her empirical study of 100 students (with a mean age of 
22) was stunning: it was clear that they clearly saw fair people as “more 
acceptable in general,” which was particularly true for women.
29
 
Given that skin color is the basis of prejudice in societies around the 
globe, it is unsurprising that discrimination based upon skin color is 
prohibited by international human rights law. What was perhaps more 
surprising at the conference, however, was that none of the papers—other 
than those penned by international human rights lawyers—and virtually 
none of the panelists—other than the international human rights lawyers—
made either written or oral references to the international instruments and 
institutions charged with remedying this state of affairs.
30
 Stephanie 
Farrior’s excellent Article, “Color” in the Non-discrimination provisions 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Two Covenants,
31
 
points out that discrimination based upon color was explicitly included in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948,
32
 and 
 
 
 26. Id. at 723. 
 27. Neha Mishra, India and Colorism: The Finer Nuances, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
725, 731 (2015). 
 28. Id. at 733. 
 29. Id.  
 30. This observation surfaced during the discussions. Participants pointed to both a lack of 
familiarity with human rights law, and frustration with its weak enforcement. 
 31. Stephanie Farrior, “Color” in the Non-discrimination Provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Two Covenants, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 741 
(2015). 
 32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, UN GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948), art. 2 [hereinafter UDHR].  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/6
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thereupon included in the two Covenants
33
 emanating from the UDHR as 
well as in the newer Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination in 1969.
34
 Professor Farrior notes that although the UN 
Charter itself refers to race, but not color, both words were used, often 
interchangeably, during the drafting of the instrument, even though in the 
early period of its negotiation, “only one colored group participated, the 
Chinese, and the equality and basic problems of Negroes and colonial 
colored people were not on the agenda.”
35
 As the negotiations continued, 
the promotion of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination 
became a “cornerstone” of the Charter, running like a “golden thread” 
through it.
36
  
The debates regarding the inclusion of anti-discrimination provisions 
on both color and race in the human rights instruments echo the 
contributions of the authors in this Issue focusing on the phenomena of 
bias based upon color and race in national systems. Some argued that 
“color” was subsumed in “race,” others argued for the separate inclusion 
of “color” in the human rights instruments, even though the UN Charter 
did not include it. Ultimately, the discussion continued as the draft wound 
its way through various stages and when finally presented to the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly and as adopted, it included both 
“’race’ and ‘color’ as distinct categories.”
37
 
The fascinating drafting history of the UDHR and subsequent treaties 
including non-discrimination provisions outlined by Farrior illuminates 
several interesting points. First, that inclusion of color at the outset was 
deliberate and heavily negotiated; second, that it’s inclusion in article 2 of 
the UDHR meant that subsequent provisions of the UDHR or other treaty 
instruments had either to refer to “race” and “color” or risk the conclusion 
that “color” was somehow excluded, or subsumed into discrimination 
based upon “race,” and finally, occasionally some provisions did slip 
 
 
 33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 4 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered 
into force on Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 34. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 
1(1), opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]. 
 35. Farrior, supra note 31, at 744 (citing Ernest Johnson, A Voice at the Peace Table?, THE 
CRISIS 345 (Nov. 1944), cited in Paul Gordon Lauren, First Principles of Racial Equality: History and 
the Politics and Diplomacy of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter, 5 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 1, 12 (1983)). 
 36. Id. at 745 (referring to a statement of John Humphrey, the Director of the Human Rights 
Division of the UN Secretariat).  
 37. Id. at 751 n.71.  
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through referring to “race” but not “color”, such as article 16 of the UDHR 
which guarantees men and women the right to marry and found a family 
“without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion.” According to 
Farrior, the Third Committee and the General Assembly approved this 
language upon the basis that “racial” discrimination includes “color-
based” discrimination.
38
 This tendency to cite “race” and “color” as 
separate grounds for discrimination but to, in practice, treat color-based 
discrimination as subsumed into assessments of racial discrimination 
continued in the elaboration of other human rights instruments and in the 
practice of the treaty bodies established to monitor compliance of states 
with their human rights obligations. According to Farrior,  
A review of the reports of the treaty bodies . . . does not reveal any 
instances when these bodies have singled out “color” as distinct 
from race or ethnicity as a basis of the discrimination about which 
they have expressed concern. Instead, the treaty bodies either refer 
just to “race” or group “color” in with race and ethnic origin.
39
  
At the same time, however, Farrior notes that advocates can use the treaty 
bodies to “raise awareness” of colorism and “draw attention of human 
rights violations based on colorism.” This is particularly true of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which has several 
mechanisms to monitor situations involving discrimination based upon 
race or color: reporting, an early-warning procedure, the examination of 
inter-state complaints, and the examination of individual complaints
40
 
Because the human rights bodies are global in nature, and have been 
operating for decades, they have now a relatively extensive jurisprudence 
on discrimination and what States must do to remedy discrimination that is 
arguably more neutral and better developed than the law in many national 
legal systems.  
Picking up on many of the themes emerging from the other Articles in 
this Issue, William Aceves notes that even though race and color are often 
used interchangeably, it is “important to treat color as a distinct category,” 
 
 
 38. Id. at 759.  
 39. Id. Professor Farrior was not referring presumably to the CERD Committee which has 
focused on color to a much greater degree than the other human rights treaty bodies according to the 
oresentation given by Professor Carlos Vasquez, who spoke at the Conference, and was elected to the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.  
 40. See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, available at http://www2. 
ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). See also Theodor Meron, The Meaning and 
Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 
AM. J. INT’L L. 283 (1985).  
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particularly “in light of growing concerns about the legitimacy of racial 
categories.”
41
 His article fittingly concludes with two important narratives 
which bring us full circle: One, the killing of Michael Brown by police 
officers in Ferguson Missouri, and his family’s question to use 
international human rights treaty bodies to put their claims for justice to a 
global audience;
42
 second, the brutal killing of Gasper Elikana, an albino, 
in Tanzania. Aceves’ Article notes the terrible discrimination that persons 
with albinism face, based upon their lighter skin color, and the efforts of 
human rights treaty bodies and activists to address them. He concludes 
that the “stories of Michael Brown and Gasper Elikana share much in 
common . . . reveal[ing] the continuing significance of skin color as a 
defining characteristic of human beings.”
43
 Both young people were 
allegedly killed based upon the color of their skin, although the facts in the 
Michael Brown case are disputed. Both suffered a lack of redress, and a 
lack of accountability and sense of impunity arguably emboldened those 
who killed them. While there may be a factual debate about the killing of 
Michael Brown, it is beyond doubt, as numerous human rights bodies have 
now found, that disproportionate numbers of young African-Americans 
die in encounters with police in the United States, or find themselves 
incarcerated or on death row in disproportionate numbers.
44
  
These nine articles, and the Conference at which the papers were first 
presented, represent but a fraction of all the stories that could be told and 
the scholarship that might be authored regarding the phenomenon of 
colorism. But they represent an important contribution to our 
understanding of the problem of skin tone bias and discrimination based 
upon color. They show that color has often been used as a proxy for race 
and that lawyers and judges—and even members of “racial” groups—are 
loath to abandon the notion of “race” entirely in favor of discrimination 
based claims based upon “color,” even while admitting that race is not a 
biologically defensible notion. In part this is due to the nature of law—it 
looks backwards, building upon precedent, and can be slow to adapt to 
changing social realities and understandings. It is also true that 
disadvantaged groups that have fought hard to win small gains based upon 
 
 
 41. Aceves, supra note 4, at 564.  
 42. See Douglas Pivnichny, Ferguson and Geneva: Bringing Human Rights Treaties to the 
Heartland, Lex Lata, Lex Ferenda, available at http://law.wustl.edu/harris/lexlata/?p=298 (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2016). 
 43. Id. at 23.  
 44. Id. at 8 (citing the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Prince Zeid ra’ad Al 
Hussein). 
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remedying racial discrimination are understandably worried that if the 
terrain shifts from “race” to “color”, those gains could evaporate. Thus 
race, color, and ethnicity remain legally salient categories in assessing and 
remedying discrimination because they are subjectively even if not 
objectively real, causing specific social harms to concrete groups of human 
beings. The albinism story is a caution, as well, that although in most 
places, for historical reasons, lighter skin is seen as more socially 
advantageous, individuals who are different than the majority around them 
for any reason, even their lighter skin, may suffer terrible discrimination 
and prejudice. Arudou’s exploration of the experience of mixed-race 
children in Japan is an important counter-narrative as well. 
This brings me to the quote with which I began this Introduction. 
Although we can dream that color will become irrelevant and character 
will be the criteria we use to judge our fellow human beings, developing 
legal doctrines and social policies to advance this goal is a real challenge. 
Several positive themes emerge, however, from the Articles in this 
collection. First, research on, education about and acknowledgment of the 
problem is clearly a critical first step in its solution. The Articles on Japan 
and Latin America suggest that many countries are simply blind to the 
treatment of minorities in their midst. Second, it is clear that this is a 
global problem, existing on every continent, and often exacerbated by 
colonialization and migration. At the same time, it is also clear that 
differences exist in how colorism manifests in different countries, making 
a one-size-fit-all solution impracticable (and probably ineffective). Third, 
accountability under the law and enforcement of non-discrimination 
provisions is critically important to combat impunity for racial and color 
discrimination. It is not sufficient to have weak laws and provide for 
private enforcement; as international human rights law requires, States 
should be required to remedy structural inequalities as part of their treaty 
obligations. Substantive equality needs to become a positive goal, not just 
non-discrimination. Finally, it is clear that conversations about race and 
color can become fraught with tension, leading to negative as opposed to 
positive dialogue and interactions. For the most part, that was not the case 
with our Conference, but deep tensions sometimes emerged in the 
discussions that were held, and can be found in even the most cursory 
review of the literature. Developing a common vocabulary and shared 
understanding across borders and within States will be critically important 
for education to take root and accountability mechanisms to become 
effective. It was a great honor for the Whitney R. Harris World Law 
Institute to organize and host this important conference; it is my hope that 
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this conference and this Symposium Issue can contribute in some small 
way towards the resolution of this pressing global problem.  
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